How Dan Andrews' right-hand man is set to take the fall for Victoria's hotel quarantine disaster instead of his boss - as farcical inquiry hears NO-ONE made deadly decision to hire private security guards
The future of Daniel Andrews' right-hand man hangs in the balance after an inquiry into Victoria's hotel quarantine program was urged to find he failed to tell the premier crucial information which may have prevented the state's second wave.
Legal counsel for the inquiry submitted their recommendations on Monday - urging it to find Mr Andrews was not kept sufficiently informed of issues with the program, which the inquiry found became a COVID-19 'seeding ground' and caused 768 deaths.
In one of a series of recommendations, counsel assisting Ben Ihle said Department of Premier and Cabinet secretary Chris Eccles should have told Mr Andrews the federal government had offered Australian Defence Force support in an April 8 email exchange.
The recommendations came after Mr Andrews told the inquiry on Friday he was not made aware that the Commonwealth was willing to provide ADF support.
He claimed that although he acknowledged Prime Minister Scott Morrison's offer to provide ADF support in a press conference on March 27, he did not understand that to mean personnel would be available for his state's hotel quarantine program.
Lawyer Rachel Ellyard remarked it was 'astonishing' that the 26 day-long inquiry had been unable to determine who decided private security should be used.
Recently arrived overseas travellers arrive at the Crown Promenade Hotel in Melbourne on March 29. Lawyers have said the decision to use private security to contain COVID-19 was not made by one person or department
'The question is "who decided private security officers needed to be engaged and they would be playing the role they played",' she said.
'That question is astonishingly still unable to be answered it would seem.'
Instead, she said the decision was a 'creeping assumption that became a reality'.
The inquiry heard the fateful decision to use guards was likely made at a meeting at the state control centre on the afternoon of March 27.
'While no one person made a decision, by the end of that state control centre meeting, it was understood by all present that that was what was going to happen,' Ms Ellyard said.
In that meeting, Victoria Police Assistant Commissioner Mick Grainger said it was the force's 'preference' private security be used.
'The expression of a preference can readily be understood to have given the clear impression that police weren't going to do it and there needed to be an alternative,' Ms Ellyard said.
'Their preference became the outcome.'
She said once the decision had been made, no one in the meeting gave 'any specific consideration' to the suitability of private security for the job.
The legal advice said in total three departmental secretaries did not adequately brief ministers about changes in the program.
Department of Premier and Cabinet secretary Chris Eccles pictured facing the inquiry in Melbourne. His future hangs in the balance after an inquiry criticised a lack of communication between departmental secretaries and Premier Daniel Andrews during the state's hotel quarantine program
As well as Mr Eccles, uncertainty also now hangs over Department of Jobs secretary Simon Phemister and Department of Health and Human Services secretary Kym Peake.
Victoria's second wave of coronavirus can be traced back to outbreaks among security guards and staff at the Rydges on Swanston and Stamford Plaza hotels in mid-May and June.
Ms Ellyard said the Department of Health and Human Services was in charge of the program but its focus was largely on 'logistics and compliance at the expense of public health'.
Mr Ihle said the program failed to meet its primary objective, which was to keep the community safe from the virus.
Suggested findings for Victorian quarantine hotels inquiry
Lawyers Tony Neal QC, Rachel Ellyard and Ben Ihle submitted their suggested findings to Victoria's hotel quarantine inquiry on Monday. They are as follows:
GOVERNMENT HAD NO PLAN
* Public servants were given just 36 hours to set up the program.
* There was no suggestion those who set up the program worked other than with 'the best of intentions and to the best of their ability'.
* 'Bad faith or corruption is not what the evidence shows.'
Calls are growing for Daniel Andrews to resign after an inquiry heard the state's hotel quarantine disaster caused 768 deaths
DHHS WAS IN CONTROL
* The Department of Jobs, Precincts and Regions played a substantial role but the Department of Health and Human Services was the control agency responsible for the program.
BRETT SUTTON SHOULD'VE BEEN IN CHARGE
* It was wrong to appoint people without public health expertise as the state controllers of the pandemic in February as it 'influenced the way in which DHHS subsequently understood and acted on its responsibilities'.
* 'Had the chief health officer or another person with public health expertise been appointed state controller ... they would have had direct oversight of the hotel quarantine program and been able to directly influence the model of that program.'
NO ONE PERSON MADE THE DECISION TO USE SECURITY GUARDS
* 'It can be best understood ... as a creeping assumption or default consensus reached in the state control centre after the preference of Victoria Police was known.'
POLICE HAD PREFERENCE FOR GUARDS
* 'It was not Victoria Police's decision, but Victoria Police's clear position that security would be preferable was a substantial contributing factor to the consensus.'
PREMIER SHOULD HAVE BEEN TOLD ABOUT ADF OFFER
* Department of Premier and Cabinet secretary Chris Eccles should have told Premier Daniel Andrews his federal counterpart had offered Australian Defence Force support in an April 8 email exchange.
* But the initial decision not to have ADF boots on the ground was 'reasonable and open - and no criticism should be directed to those who made those operational decisions'.
CONTRACTS WERE INAPPROPRIATE
* 'There was insufficient supervision of those contracts to ensure compliance with the contractual terms, including as to subcontracting.'
* 'The contracts with hotels and security companies should not have placed responsibility for PPE and infection control education on those contractors.'
HOTEL QUARANTINE RESPONSIBLE FOR SECOND WAVE
* Ninety per cent of second wave COVID-19 cases are attributable to the Rydges on Swanston outbreak in mid-May. Just under 10 per cent were attributable to the outbreak at the Stamford Hotel in mid-June.
* 'The hotel quarantine program in Victoria failed to achieve its primary objective. The program that was intended to contain the disease was instead a seeding ground for the spread of COVID-19 into the broader community.'
* 'The failure by the hotel quarantine program to contain this virus is, as at today's date, responsible for the deaths of 768 people and the infection of some 18,418 others.'
PEOPLE IN QUARANTINE NOT LOOKED AFTER
* 'The program did not always operate so as to meet the needs of those who were detained, in particular, those who had specific needs or vulnerabilities.'
* 'Very early on, better consideration ought to have been given to the likely psychosocial impact of detention and expert advice should have been sought.'
* 'Exemptions could and likely should have been granted in more situations.'
LACK OF TRANSPARENCY
* 'There were significant issues which should have been brought to the respective ministers' attention. The departmental secretaries were obliged to ensure that they discharged those obligations.'
* 'They likely contributed to a loss in opportunities to identify and address issues which may have prompted better, fuller and more timely action.'
The submissions may form the recommendations of the inquiry's chair, retired judge Jennifer Coate. She is due to deliver her final report to Victorian Governor Linda Dessau by November 6.
Lawyer Rachel Ellyard pictured during Monday's hearing. She said there was 'astonishingly' no answer to the question of who decided to hire private security guards
'The program that was intended to contain the disease, was instead a seeding ground for the spread of COVID-19 into the community,' Mr Ihle said.
'The failure by the hotel quarantine program to contain this virus is, as at today's date, responsible for the deaths of 768 people and the infection of 18,418 others.
'One only needs to pause and to reflect on those figures to appreciate the full scope of devastation and despair occasioned as a result of the outbreaks.'
Calls meanwhile are growing for Daniel Andrews to resign.
Pictured: A traveller returned from overseas is checked into an inner-city hotel in Melbourne on March 30. Lawyers for the inquiry said the program failed to meet its primary objective
Victorian Opposition leader Michael O'Brien said the quarantine operation was 'the worst failure of public administration in Victorian history'.
He added: 'If accountability for the deaths and damage is to mean anything, all those responsible must go - starting with Andrews.'
On Monday afternoon the final day of Victoria's hotel quarantine inquiry heard the program's failure was responsible for the deaths of all 768 residents who have died in the state's second wave.
The final day of Victoria's hotel quarantine inquiry heard the program's failure was responsible for the deaths of all 768 residents who died in the state's second wave. Pictured: Security guards at a quarantine hotel
Mr Ihle said protective gear was not used properly, staff were poorly trained and there was a lack of social distancing at the quarantine hotels.
He said the system was set up quickly and the government failed to monitor it.
'What was established was necessarily untested and prudence dictated that the program should have been accompanied by intensive ongoing monitoring and auditing,' he said.
'The Victorian government failed to adequately ensure that this was done.'
Former Health Minister Jenny Mikakos resigned on Saturday after Mr Andrews said she was 'accountable' for the quarantine program.
On Sunday Mr Andrews said he would not resign, telling reporters: 'I don't run from problems and challenges'.
Opposition leader Michael O'Brien
Melbourne's second wave of coronavirus was sparked in late May when the disease escaped from a quarantine hotel and rapidly spread around the city.
'The scientific evidence now strongly suggests, and we submit that the board can comfortably find, that 90 per cent of positive cases in Victoria since 26 are attributable to that initial outbreak at the Rydges in late May,' Mr Ihle said.
The Victorian government has been criticised for using private security guards to man the hotels instead of the police and ADF troops like in New South Wales and Queensland.
Contracts written up by the Department of Jobs, Precincts and Regions left infection control and training in personal protective equipment use to the security companies.
Hotels, meanwhile, were responsible for cleaning, unless a returned traveller tested positive to Covid-19.
'Responsibility for managing the risk of infection and providing for the safety of those involved in the program should have remained with the state. No contract should have purported to outsource those matters,' Ms Ellyard said.
Counsel assisting Tony Neal QC said there was no suggestion those who set up the program worked other than with 'the best of intentions and to the best of their ability'.
'Bad faith or corruption is not what the evidence shows,' he said.
'Yet it is true that the hastily assembled program failed at two locations within approximately two and a half months and with disastrous consequences.
'A multitude of decisions, actions and inaction, many of which compounded the effect of the other, ultimately expressed itself in the outbreaks which subverted the very reason for the existence of a hotel quarantine program.
Hotel quarantine: A timeline
* March 27 - National cabinet announces returned overseas travellers will have to complete 14 days of hotel quarantine. The Australia Defence Force prepares 100 personnel in each large state (and 50 in smaller states and territories) to 'support expected quarantine compliance monitoring requests'. NSW and Queensland accept the support, Victoria decides to use private security guards. The decision is made at a 4:30pm meeting in Victoria's state control centre.
* March 28 - At another state control centre meeting, Emergency Management Victoria Commissioner Andrew Crisp says there is no need for ADF 'boots on the ground'. Victoria's hotel quarantine program, named Operation Soteria, launches at 11:59pm.
* April 8 - Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet secretary Philip Gaetjens emails Victoria's Department of Premier and Cabinet secretary Chris Eccles to offer ADF assistance.
* April 9 - Public Health Commander Finn Romanes writes to Department of Health and Human Services secretary warning of a 'risk to the health and safety of detainees' due to governance issues. Letter backed by Chief Health Officer Brett Sutton and his deputy Annaliese van Diemen.
* April 11 - Man takes own life while in quarantine at Pan Pacific hotel.
* May 15 - A family of four with COVID-19 are moved to the Rydges on Swanston hotel, a 'hot' hotel.
* May 25 - A staff member at the Rydges on Swanston tests positive to COVID-19. Two others develop symptoms.
* May 27 - Rydges on Swanston outbreak first identified by the DHHS. It will grow to 17 people who have either worked at the hotel, or are household members or social contacts.
* June 1 - Stage-three restrictions eased.
* June 14 - Staff member at Stamford Plaza tests positive to COVID-19.
* June 17 - Stamford Plaza outbreak identified by DHHS. The cluster will grow to 46 people.
* June 21 - Further easing of restrictions.
* June 24 - Mr Crisp requests 850 ADF personnel to replace private security at hotels. Request rescinded a day later as the Department of Justice and Community Safety takes over the program.
* June 26 - It's revealed 30 per cent of travellers in hotel quarantine are refusing tests.
* June 29 - Hot-spot Melbourne suburbs return to lockdown and international flights diverted.
* June 30 - Premier Daniel Andrews announces an inquiry into the hotel quarantine program after genomic sequencing revealed a number of COVID-19 cases can be linked to 'staff members in hotel quarantine breaching well-known and well-understood infection control protocols'.
* July 4 - Hard lockdown announced at short notice for nine public housing towers. State records 108 new cases - its first day above 100 since late March.
* July 4, July 6, July 11 - As Victorian cases escalate, Prime Minister Scott Morrison writes to Mr Andrews three times offering ADF support.
* July 6 - The Victoria-NSW border shuts for first time in century.
* July 8 - Melbourne and Mitchell Shire go into stage-three lockdown for six weeks.
* July 20 - Hotel Quarantine Inquiry begins.
* August 2 - Victoria records 671 cases and seven deaths. State of disaster declared, stage four restrictions imposed.
* August 5 - Stage four restrictions delay inquiry's public hearings by two weeks. State records 725 new cases and 15 deaths.
* August 11 - Mr Andrews tells a parliamentary inquiry ADF support was not offered for hotel quarantine, sparking war of words with federal Defence Minister Linda Reynolds.
* August 17 - Public hearings at inquiry begin.
* August 18 - DHHS epidemiologist Charles Alpren tells inquiry 99 per cent of active cases in Victoria stem from Rydges and Stamford outbreaks.
* September 6 - Stage four restrictions extended until October.
* September 25 - Mr Andrews appears before inquiry, apologises for mistakes. The program is responsible for more than 18,000 COVID-19 infections and 750 deaths.
* September 26 - Health Minister Jenny Mikakos resigns.
* September 28 - Inquiry's closing submissions. Final report due November 6.
Source: AAP